In this paper, we investigate the effects of an additional trusted relay node on the secrecy of multiple-access wiretap channel (MAC-WT) by considering the model of multiple-access relay wiretap channel (MARC-WT). More specifically, first, we investigate the discrete memoryless MARC-WT. Three inner bounds (with respect to decodeforward (DF), noise-forward (NF) and compress-forward (CF) strategies) on the secrecy capacity region are provided.
I. INTRODUCTION
Equivocation was first introduced into channel coding by Wyner in his study of wiretap channel [2] . It is a kind of discrete memoryless degraded broadcast channels. The object is to transmit messages to the legitimate receiver, while keeping the wiretapper as ignorant of the messages as possible. Based on Wyners work, Leung-Yan-Cheong and Hellman studied the Gaussian wiretap channel (GWC) [3] , and showed that its secrecy capacity was the difference between the main channel capacity and the overall wiretap channel capacity (the cascade of main channel and wiretap channel).
After the publication of Wyner's work, Csiszár and Körner [4] investigated a more general situation: the broadcast channels with confidential messages (BCC). In this model, a common message and a confidential message were sent through a general broadcast channel. The common message was assumed to be decoded correctly by the legitimate receiver and the wiretapper, while the confidential message was only allowed to be obtained by the legitimate receiver. This model is also a generalization of [5] , where no confidentiality condition is imposed. The capacity-equivocation region and the secrecy capacity region of BCC [4] were also a generalization of those in [2] . Furthermore, the capacity-equivocation region of Gaussian BCC was determined in [21] .
By using the approach of [2] and [4] , the information-theoretic security for other multi-user communication systems has been widely studied, see the followings.
• For the broadcast channel, Liu et al. [6] studied the broadcast channel with two confidential messages (no common message), and provided an inner bound on the secrecy capacity region. Furthermore, Xu et al. [7] studied the broadcast channel with two confidential messages and one common message, and provided inner and outer bounds on the capacity-equivocation region.
• For the multiple-access channel (MAC), the security problems are split into two directions.
-The first is that two users wish to transmit their corresponding messages to a destination, and meanwhile, they also receive the channel output. Each user treats the other user as a wiretapper, and wishes to keep its confidential message as secret as possible from the wiretapper. This model is usually called the MAC with confidential messages, and it was studied by Liang and Poor [8] . An inner bound on the capacity-equivocation region is provided for the model with two confidential messages, and the capacityequivocation region is still not known. Furthermore, for the model of MAC with one confidential message [8] , both inner and outer bounds on capacity-equivocation region are derived. Moreover, for the degraded MAC with one confidential message, the capacity-equivocation region is totally determined.
-The second is that an additional wiretapper has access to the MAC output via a wiretap channel, and therefore, how to keep the confidential messages of the two users as secret as possible from the additional wiretapper is the main concern of the system designer. This model is usually called the multiple-access wiretap channel (MAC-WT). The Gaussian MAC-WT was investigated in [9] , [10] . An inner bound on the capacity-equivocation region is provided for the Gaussian MAC-WT. Other related works on MAC-WT can be found in [11] , [12] , [13] , [14] , [15] .
• For the interference channel, Liu et al. [6] studied the interference channel with two confidential messages, and provided inner and outer bounds on the secrecy capacity region. In addition, Liang et al. [16] studied the cognitive interference channel with one common message and one confidential message, and the capacityequivocation region was totally determined for this model.
• For the relay channel, Lai and Gamal [17] studied the relay-eavesdropper channel, where a source wishes to send messages to a destination while leveraging the help of a trusted relay node to hide those messages from the eavesdropper. Three inner bounds (with respect to decode-forward, noise-forward and compress-forward strategies) and one outer bound on the capacity-equivocation region were provided in [17] . Furthermore, Tang et. al. [26] introduced the noise-forward strategy of [17] into the wireless communication networks, and found that with the help of an independent interferer, the security of the wireless communication networks is enhanced. In addition, Oohama [18] studied the relay channel with confidential messages, where a relay helps the transmission of messages from one sender to one receiver. The relay is considered not only as a sender that helps the message transmission but also as a wiretapper who can obtain some knowledge about the transmitted messages. Measuring the uncertainty of the relay by equivocation, the inner and outer bounds on the capacity-equivocation region were provided in [18] .
Recently, Ekrem and Ulukus [19] investigated the effects of user cooperation on the secrecy of broadcast channels by considering a cooperative relay broadcast channel. They showed that user cooperation can increase the achievable secrecy rate region of [6] .
In this paper, we study the multiple-access relay wiretap channel (MARC-WT), see Figure 1 . This model generalizes the MAC-WT by considering an additional trusted relay node. The motivation of this work is to investigate the effects of the trusted relay node on the secrecy of MAC-WT, and whether the achievable secrecy rate region of [10] can be enhanced by using an additional relay node. relay strategies are used in the construction of the inner bounds. Second, we investigate the degraded discrete memoryless MARC-WT, and present an outer bound on the secrecy capacity region of this degraded case. Finally, the Gaussian model of Figure 1 is investigated, and we find that with the help of this additional trusted relay node, Tekin-Yeners achievable secrecy rate region of the Gaussian MAC-WT [10] is enhanced.
In this paper, random variab1es, sample values and alphabets are denoted by capital letters, lower case letters and calligraphic letters, respectively. A similar convention is applied to the random vectors and their sample values.
For example, U N denotes a random N -vector (U 1 , ..., U N ), and u N = (u 1 , ..., u N ) is a specific vector value in U N that is the N th Cartesian power of U. U N i denotes a random N − i + 1-vector (U i , ..., U N ), and u N i = (u i , ..., u N ) is a specific vector value in U N i . Let P V (v) denote the probability mass function P r{V = v}. Throughout the paper, the logarithmic function is to the base 2.
The organization of this paper is as follows. Section II provides the achievable secrecy rate regions of the discrete memoryless model of Figure 1 . The Gaussian model of Figure 1 is investigated in Section III. Final conclusions are provided in Section IV.
II. DISCRETE MEMORYLESS MULTIPLE-ACCESS RELAY WIRETAP CHANNEL

A. Inner bounds on the secrecy capacity region of the discrete memoryless MARC-WT
The discrete memoryless model of Figure 1 is a five-terminal discrete channel consisting of finite sets X 1 , X 2 , X r , Y , Y r , Z and a transition probability distribution P Y,Yr,Z|X1,X2,Xr (y, y r , z|x 1 , x 2 , x r ). X N 1 , X N 2 and X N r are the channel inputs from the transmitters and the relay respectively, while Y N , Y N r , Z N are the channel outputs at the legitimate receiver, the relay and the wiretapper, respectively. The channel is discrete memoryless, i.e., the channel outputs (y i , y r,i , z i ) at time i only depend on the channel inputs (x 1,i , x 2,i , x r,i ) at time i. Definition 1: (Channel encoders) The confidential messages W 1 and W 2 take values in W 1 , W 2 , respectively. W 1 and W 2 are independent and uniformly distributed over their ranges. The channel encoders f E1 and f E2 are stochastic encoders that map the messages w 1 and w 2 into the codewords x N 1 ∈ X N 1 and x N 2 ∈ X N 2 , respectively. The transmission rates of the confidential messages W 1 and W 2 are log W1 N and log W2 N , respectively. Definition 2: (Relay encoder) The relay encoder ϕ i is also a stochastic encoder that maps the signals (y r,1 , y r,2 , ..., y r,i−1 ) received before time i to the channel input x r,i .
Definition 3: (Decoder) The Decoder for the legitimate receiver is a mapping
input Y N and outputsŴ 1 ,Ŵ 2 . Let P e be the error probability of the legitimate receiver, and it is defined as
The equivocation rate at the wiretapper is defined as
is called achievable if, for any > 0 (where is an arbitrary small positive real number and → 0), there exists a channel encoder-decoder (N, ∆, P e ) such that
The secrecy capacity region R d is a set composed of all achievable secrecy rate pairs (R 1 , R 2 ). Three inner bounds (with respect to DF, NF and CF strategies) on R d are provided in the following Theorem 1, 2, 3.
Our first step is to characterize the inner bound on the secrecy capacity region R d by using Cover-Gamal's Decode and Forward (DF) Strategy [22] . In the DF Strategy, the relay node will first decode the confidential messages, and then re-encode them to cooperate with the transmitters. The superposition coding and random binning techniques will be combined with the classical DF strategy [22] to characterize the DF inner bound of Figure 1 . 
Proof:
The achievable coding scheme is a combination of [25] , [20] and [10] , and the details about the proof are provided in Appendix A.
Remark 1: There are some notes on Theorem 1, see the following.
• If we let Z = const (which implies that there is no wiretapper), the region R d1 reduces to the region R marc ,
where
Here note that the region R marc is exactly the same as the DF region of the discrete memoryless multiple-access relay channel [25] , [20] .
• If we let Y r = Y and V 1 = V 2 = X r = const (which implies that there is no relay), the region R d1 reduces to the region R mac−wt , where
Also note that the region R mac−wt is exactly the same as the achievable secrecy rate region of discrete memoryless multiple-access wiretap channel [10] .
The second step is to characterize the inner bound on the secrecy capacity region R d by using the noise and forward (NF) strategy. In the NF Strategy, the relay node does not attempt to decode the messages but sends codewords that are independent of the transmitters' messages, and these codewords aid in confusing the wiretapper.
More Specifically, if the channel from the relay to the legitimate receiver is less noisy than the channel from the relay to the wiretapper, we allow the legitimate receiver to decode the relay codeword, and the wiretapper can not decode it. Therefore, in this case, the relay codeword can be viewed as a noise signal to confuse the wiretapper.
On the other hand, if the channel from the relay to the legitimate receiver is more noisy than the channel from the relay to the wiretapper, we allow both the receivers to decode the relay codeword, and therefore, in this case, the relay codeword does not make any contribution to the security of the model of Figure 1 .
Theorem 2: (Inner bound 2: NF strategy) A single-letter characterization of the region R d2 (R d2 ⊆ R d ) is as follows,
where L 1 is given by
, L 2 is given by
P Y,Z,Yr ,Xr ,X 1 ,X 2 :
, P Y,Z,Yr,Xr,X1,X2 (y, z, y r , x r , x 1 , x 2 , u) satisfies P Y,Z,Yr,Xr,X1,X2 (y, z, y r , x r , x 1 , x 2 ) = P Y,Z,Yr|Xr,X1,X2 (y, z, y r |x r , x 1 , x 2 )P Xr (x r )P X1 (x 1 )P X2 (x 2 ), and R r is denoted by R r = min{I(X r ; Y ), I(X r ; Z|X 1 ), I(X r ; Z|X 2 )}.
The achievable coding scheme is a combination of [17, Theorem 3] and [10] , and the details about the proof are provided in Appendix B.
Remark 2: There are some notes on Theorem 2, see the following.
• The region L 1 is characterized under the condition that the channel from the relay to the legitimate receiver is less noisy than the channel from the relay to the wiretapper (I(X r ; Y ) ≥ I(X r ; Z)). Then, in this case, the legitimate receiver is allowed to decode the relay codeword, and the wiretapper is not allowed to decode it.
The rate of the relay is defined as R r = min{I(X r ; Y ), I(X r ; Z|X 1 ), I(X r ; Z|X 2 )}, and the relay codeword is viewed as pure noise for the wiretapper.
• The region L 2 is characterized under the condition that the channel from the relay to the legitimate receiver is more noisy than the channel from the relay to the wiretapper (I(X r ; Y ) ≤ I(X r ; Z)). Then, in this case, both the legitimate receiver and the wiretapper are allowed to decode the relay codeword. The rate of the relay is defined as R r = I(X r ; Y ), and the relay codeword does not make any contribution to the security of the model of Figure 1 .
The third step is to characterize the inner bound on the secrecy capacity region R d by using a combination of Cover-Gamals compress and forward (CF) strategy [22] and the NF strategy provided in Theorem 2, i.e., in addition to the independent codewords, the relay also sends a quantized version of its noisy observations to the legitimate receiver. This noisy version of the relay's observations helps the legitimate receiver in decoding the transmitters' messages, while the independent codewords help in confusing the wiretapper. 
where L 3 is given by
, R * r1 = min{I(X r ; Z|X 1 ), I(X r ; Z|X 2 ), I(X r ; Y )}, and L 4 is given by 
The joint probability P Y,Z,Yr,Ŷr,Xr,X1,X2 (y, z, y r ,ŷ r , x r , x 1 , x 2 ) satisfies P Y,Z,Yr,Ŷr,Xr,X1,X2 (y, z, y r ,ŷ r , x r , x 1 , x 2 ) = PŶ r |Yr,Xr (ŷ r |y r , x r )P Y,Z,Yr|Xr,X1,X2 (y, z, y r |x r , x 1 , x 2 )P Xr (x r )P X1 (x 1 )P X2 (x 2 ).
The achievable coding scheme is a combination of [17, Theorem 4] and [10] , and the details about the proof are provided in Appendix C.
Remark 3: There are some notes on Theorem 3, see the following.
• In L 3 , the channel from the relay to the legitimate receiver is less noisy than the channel from the relay to the wiretapper (I(X r ; Y ) ≥ I(X r ; Z)). Then, in this case, the legitimate receiver is allowed to decode the relay codeword, and the wiretapper is not allowed to decode it. Here note that R * is the rate of pure noise generated by the relay to confuse the wiretapper, while R * r1 − R * is the part of the rate allocated to send the compressed signalŶ r to help the legitimate receiver. If R * = R * r1 , this scheme is exactly the same as the NF scheme.
• In L 4 , the channel from the relay to the legitimate receiver is more noisy than the channel from the relay to the wiretapper (I(X r ; Y ) ≤ I(X r ; Z)). Then, in this case, both the legitimate receiver and the wiretapper are allowed to decode the relay codeword. However, The relay can still help to enhance the security of the model of Figure 1 by sending the compressed signalŶ r to the legitimate receiver. Thus, the region L 4 is characterized by combining the L 2 of Theorem 2 with the classical compress and forward (CF) strategy [22] .
B. Outer bound on the secrecy capacity region of the degraded discrete memoryless MARC-WT
Compared with the discrete memoryless model of Figure 1 , the degraded discrete memoryless MARC-WT implies the existence of a Markov chain (X 1 ,
The secrecy capacity region R dd of the degraded discrete memoryless MARC-WT is a set composed of all achievable secrecy rate pairs (R 1 , R 2 ). An outer bound on R dd is provided in the following Theorem 4.
Proof:
The details about the proof are provided in Appendix D.
III. GAUSSIAN MULTIPLE-ACCESS RELAY WIRETAP CHANNEL
In this section, we investigate the Gaussian multiple-access relay wiretap channel (GMARC-WT). The signal received at each node is given by
r ] ≤ P r . The remainder of this section is organized as follows. Subsection III-A shows the achievable secrecy rate regions of GMARC-WT, and the numerical examples and discussions are given in Subsection III-B.
A. Capacity results on GMARC-WT Theorem 5: The DF inner bound on the secrecy capacity region of the Gaussian case of Figure 1 is given by
Proof:
. Here note that V 1 , V 2 , X 10 and X 20 are independent random variables.
The region R g1 is obtained by substituting the above definitions into Theorem 1, and maximizing α and β (the maximum of R g1 is achieved when α = β = 1). Thus, the proof of Theorem 5 is completed.
Theorem 6: Then, the NF inner bound on the secrecy capacity region of the Gaussian case of Figure 1 is given by
where G 1 is given by
and G 2 is given by
Here note that N 1 ≤ N 2 implies I(X r ; Y ) ≥ I(X r ; Z). The region G 1 is obtained by substituting X 1 ∼ N (0, P 1 ), X 2 ∼ N (0, P 2 ) and X r ∼ N (0, P r ) into the region L 1 of Theorem 2, and using the fact that X 1 , X 2 and X r are independent random variables.
Analogously, N 1 ≥ N 2 implies I(X r ; Y ) ≤ I(X r ; Z). The region G 2 is obtained by substituting X 1 ∼ N (0, P 1 ), X 2 ∼ N (0, P 2 ) and X r ∼ N (0, P r ) into the region L 2 of Theorem 2, and using the fact that X 1 , X 2 and X r are independent random variables. Thus, the proof of Theorem 6 is completed.
Theorem 7: Next, the CF inner bound on the secrecy capacity region of the Gaussian case of Figure 1 is given by
where G 3 is given by
and G 4 is given by
Pr .
Proof:
Here note that N 1 ≤ N 2 implies I(X r ; Y ) ≥ I(X r ; Z). The region G 3 is obtained by substituting X 1 ∼ N (0, P 1 ),
into the region L 3 of Theorem 3, and using the fact that X 1 , X 2 and X r are independent random variables.
into the region L 4 of Theorem 3, and using the fact that X 1 , X 2 and X r are independent random variables. Thus, the proof of Theorem 7 is completed.
Theorem 8: Finally, remember that [10] provides an achievable secrecy rate region R Gi of the Gaussian multiple-access wiretap channel (GMAC-WT), and it is given by
The proof is in [10] , and it is omitted here.
B. Numerical Examples and Discussions
Letting P Compared with the achievable secrecy rate region R Gi of GMAC-WT, it is easy to see that the NF (R g2 ) and
CF (R g3 ) strategies help to enhance R Gi (no relay). However, for the DF strategy (R g1 ), we find that when N r is much larger than N 1 , the DF region R g1 is even smaller than R Gi , i.e., the relay makes the things even worse.
When N r is close to N 1 (still larger than N 1 ), the DF region R g1 is larger than R Gi , but it is still smaller than the NF and CF regions. When N r is smaller than N 1 , as we can see in Figure 4 , the DF region performs the best! In addition, when Q → ∞, the CF region R g3 is exactly the same as the NF region R g2 . 
IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper, first, we provide three inner bounds on the secrecy capacity region (achievable secrecy rate regions)
of the discrete memoryless model of Figure 1 . The decode-forward (DF), noise-forward (NF), and compress-forward (CF) relay strategies are used in the construction of these inner bounds. Second, we investigate the degraded discrete memoryless MARC-WT, and present an outer bound on the secrecy capacity region of this degraded case. Finally,
we study the Gaussian model of Figure 1 , and find that the NF and CF strategies help to enhance Tekin-Yener's achievable secrecy rate region of Gaussian MAC-WT. Moreover, we find that if the channel from the transmitters to the relay is less noisy than the channels from the transmitters to the legitimate receiver and the wiretapper, the DF strategy performs even better than the NF and CF strategies.
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is achievable, and the achievability proof for (
) follows by symmetry.
The coding scheme combines the decode-and-forward (DF) strategy of MARC [20] , random binning, superposition coding, and block Markov coding techniques, see the followings.
First, define the messages W 1 and W 2 taken values in the alphabets W 1 and W 2 , respectively, where
Here note that R 1 and R 2 satisfy
and
Code Construction: Fix the joint probability mass function P Y,Z,Yr|Xr,X1,X2 (y, z, y r |x r ,
. For arbitrary > 0, define
Relay Code-books Construction:
Transmitters' Code-books Construction:
In addition, partition these 2 N (R1+R * 1 ) i.i.d. sequences x N 1 into 2 N Rr1 bins. These bins are denoted as {a 1 , a 2 , ...,
sequences about x N 1 . Note that here for given w 1 , w * 1 and s 1 , the index of the bin which x N 1 (w 1 , w * 1 |s 1 belongs to, is totally determined.
sequences about x N 2 . Note that here for given w 2 , w * 2 and s 2 , the index of the bin which x N 2 (w 2 , w * 2 |s 2 belongs to, is totally determined.
Encoding: Encoding involves the mapping of message indices to channel inputs, which are facilitated by the sequences generated above. We exploit the block Markov coding scheme, as argued in [22] , the loss induced by this scheme is negligible as the number of blocks n → ∞. For block i (1 ≤ i ≤ n), encoding proceeds as follows.
First, for convenience, the messages w 1 , w * 1 , w 2 , w * 2 , s 1 and s 2 transmitted in the i-th block are denoted by w 1,i , w * 1,i , w 2,i , w * 2,i , s 1,i and s 2,i , respectively.
• (Channel encoders)
1) The message w * 1,i (1 ≤ i ≤ n) is randomly chosen from the set {1, 2, ..., 2 N R * 1 }. The transmitter 1 (encoder
is randomly chosen from the set {1, 2, ..., 2 N R * 2 }. The transmitter 2 (encoder 2) sends x N 2 (w 2,1 , w * 2,1 |1) at the first block (s 2,1 = 1), x N 2 (w 2,i , w * 2,i |s 2,i ) from block 2 ≤ i ≤ n − 1, and x N 2 (1, 1|s 2,n ) at block n (w 2,n = w * 2,n = 1).
• (Relay encoder)
The relay sends 1) ) at the first block, and
Decoding: Decoding proceeds as follows.
1) (At the relay) At the end of block i (1 ≤ i ≤ n), the relay already has an estimation of the s 1,i and s 2,i (denoted byŝ 1,i andŝ 2,i , respectively), and will declare that it receivesŝ 2,i+1 if this is the only triple such that (x N 2 (ŵ 2,i ,ŵ * 2,i |ŝ 2,i ), x N r (ŝ 1,i ,ŝ 2,i ), y N r (i)) are jointly typical. Here note that y N r (i) indicates the output sequence y N r in block i.ŝ 2,i+1 is the index of the bin which x N 2 (ŵ 2,i ,ŵ * 2,i |ŝ 2,i ) belongs to, and it will be used in the i + 1-th block. Based on the AEP, the probability P r{ŝ 2,i+1 = s 2,i+1 } goes to 1 if
where (a) is from the Markov chains
After the relay successfully decodesŵ 2,i ,ŵ * 2,i and the correspondingŝ 2,i+1 , he tries to find a unique codeword
are jointly typical. Herê s 1,i+1 is the index of the bin which x N 1 (ŵ 1,i ,ŵ * 1,i |ŝ 1,i ) belongs to, and it will be used in the i + 1-th block. Based on the AEP, the probability P r{ŝ 1,i+1 = s 1,i+1 } goes to 1 if
2) (At the legitimate receiver)
• The legitimate receiver decodes from the last block, i.e., block n. Suppose that at the end of block n, the legitimate receiver will declare thatš 2,n is received if (v N 2 (š 2,n ), y N (n)) jointly typical. Based on the AEP, the probability P r{š 2,n = s 2,n } goes to 1 if
After gettingš 2,n , the legitimate receiver can get an estimation of s 2,i (1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1) in a similar way.
• After decodingš 2,i andš 2,i+1 (1 ≤ i ≤ n), the legitimate receiver tries to find a x N 2 (w 2,i ,w * 2,i |š 2,i ) such that (x N 2 (w 2,i ,w * 2,i |š 2,i ), v N 2 (š 2,i ), y N (i)) are jointly typical. Based on the AEP, the probability P r{(w 2,i ,w * 2,i ) = (w 2,i , w * 2,i )} goes to 1 if
• After decodingš 2,i ,w 2,i andw * 2,i (1 ≤ i ≤ n), the legitimate receiver tries to find v N 1 (š 1,i ) and
are jointly typical. Based on the AEP, the probability P r{š 1,i = s 1,i } goes to 1 if
where (c) is from the Markov chain
are jointly typical. Based on the AEP, the probability P r{(w 1,i ,w * 1,i ) = (w 1,i , w * 1,i )} goes to 1 if
where (d) is from the Markov chains The following Table I shows the transmitted codewords in the first three blocks.
By using (A1), (A2), (A3), (A4), (A5), (A6), (A7), (A8), (A9), (A10), (A11) and (A12), it is easy to check that P e ≤ . It remains to show that lim N →∞ ∆ ≥ R 1 + R 2 , see the followings.
Equivocation Analysis:
The first term in (A13) is bounded as follows.
where (a) follows from W 1 → X N 1 → Z N and H(W 1 |X N 1 ) = 0. Consider the first term in (A14), the code-book generation of x N 1 shows that the total number of x N 1 is 2 N (R1+R * 1 ) = 2 N (min{I(X1;Yr|Xr,X2,V1,V2),I(X1,Xr;Y |X2,V2)}− ) ( → 0 as N → ∞). Thus, using the same approach as that in [8, Lemma 3], we have
For the second term in (A14), using the same approach as that in [4, Lemma 3], we get
Now, we consider the last term of (A14). Given Z N and W 1 , the total number of possible codewords of x N 1 is 2 N R * 1 = 2 N (I(X1;Z)− ) ( → 0 as N → ∞). By using the Fano's inequality, we have
Substituting (A15), (A16) and (A17) into (A14), we have
The second term in (A13) is bounded as follows.
where (1) is from the Markov chain W 1 → (Z N , X N 1 ) → W 2 , and (2) is from the Markov chain W 2 → (X N 1 , X N 2 ) → Z N . Consider the first term in (A19), the code-book generation of x N 2 shows that the total number of x N 2 is 2 N (R2+R * 2 ) = 2 N (min{I(X2;Yr|Xr,V1,V2),I(X2,V2;Y )}− ) ( → 0 as N → ∞). Thus, using the same approach as that in [8, Lemma 3], we have
For the second term in (A19), using the same approach as that in [4, Lemma 3], we get
Now, we consider the last term of (A19). Given Z N , X N 1 and W 2 , the total number of possible codewords of x N 2 is 2 N R * 2 = 2 I(X2;Z|X1)− ( → 0 as N → ∞). By using the Fano's inequality, we have
Substituting (A20), (A21) and (A22) into (A19), we have
Substituting (A18) and (A23) into (A13), lim N →∞ ∆ ≥ R 1 + R 2 is proved.
The proof of Theorem 1 is completed.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 2 Theorem 2 is proved by the following two cases.
• (Case 1) If the channel from the relay to the legitimate receiver is less noisy than the channel from the relay to the wiretapper (I(X r ; Y ) ≥ I(X r ; Z)), we allow the legitimate receiver to decode x N r , and the wiretapper can not decode it.
For case 1, it is sufficient to show that the pair (R 1 , R 2 ) ∈ L 1 with the condition
is achievable. The achievability proof of (
I(X 2 , X r ; Z) + R r ) follows by symmetry.
• (Case 2) If the channel from the relay to the legitimate receiver is more noisy than the channel from the relay to the wiretapper (I(X r ; Y ) ≤ I(X r ; Z)), we allow both the receivers to decode x N r . For case 2, it is sufficient to show that the pair (R 1 , R 2 ) ∈ L 2 with the condition
Fix the joint probability mass function P Y,Z,Yr|Xr,X1,X2 (y, z, y r |x r , x 1 , x 2 )P Xr (x r )P X1 (x 1 )P X2 (x 2 ). Define the messages W 1 , W 2 taken values in the alphabets W 1 , W 2 , respectively, where
Code-book Construction for the Two Cases:
• Code-book construction for case 1:
-First, generate at random 2 N (Rr− ) ( → 0 as N → ∞) i.i.d. sequences at the relay node each drawn
Here note that 
-Third, generate 2 N (I(X1;Y |X2,Xr)− ) i.i.d. codewords x N 1 according to P X1 (x 1 ), and divide them into 2 N R1 bins. Each bin contains 2 N (I(X1;Y |X2,Xr)− −R1) codewords, where
Encoding for both cases:
The relay uniformly picks a codeword x N r (a) from [1, 2 N (Rr− ) ], and sends x N r (a). For a given confidential message w 2 , randomly choose a codeword x N 2 in bin w 2 to transmit. Similarly, for a given confidential message w 1 , randomly choose a codeword x N 1 in bin w 1 to transmit.
Decoding for both cases:
For a given y N , try to find a sequence x N r (â) such that (x N r (â), y N ) are jointly typical. If there exists a unique sequence with the indexâ, put out the correspondingâ, else declare a decoding error. Based on the AEP and (A26) (or (A29)), the probability P r{â = a} goes to 1.
After decodingâ, the legitimate receiver tries to find a sequence x N 2 (ŵ 2 ) such that (x N 2 (ŵ 2 ), x N r (â), y N ) are jointly typical. If there exists a unique sequence with the indexŵ 2 , put out the correspondingŵ 2 , else declare a decoding error. Based on the AEP and the construction of x N 2 for both cases, the probability P r{ŵ 2 = w 2 } goes to 1.
Finally, after decodingâ andŵ 2 , the legitimate receiver tries to find a sequence x N 1 (ŵ 1 ) such that (x N 1 (ŵ 1 ), x N 2 (ŵ 2 ), x N r (â), y N ) are jointly typical. If there exists a unique sequence with the indexŵ 1 , put out the correspondingŵ 1 , else declare a decoding error. Based on the AEP and the construction of x N 1 for both cases, the probability P r{ŵ 1 = w 1 } goes to 1. P e ≤ is easy to be checked by using the above encoding-decoding schemes. Now, it remains to prove lim N →∞ ∆ ≥ R 1 + R 2 for both cases, see the followings.
Equivocation Analysis:
Proof of lim N →∞ ∆ ≥ R 1 + R 2 for case 1:
where (a) follows from W 1 → (X N 1 , X N r ) → Z N , H(W 1 |X N 1 ) = 0 and the fact that X N 1 is independent of X N r . Consider the first term in (A33), the code-book generation of x N 1 shows that the total number of x N 1 is 2 N (I(X1;Y |X2,Xr)− ) ( → 0 as N → ∞). Thus, using the same approach as that in [8, Lemma 3], we have
For the second term in (A33), the code-book generation of x N r guarantees that
For the third term in (A33), using the same approach as that in [4, Lemma 3], we get
Now, we consider the last term of (A33). Given w 1 , the wiretapper can do joint decoding. Specifically, given z N and w 1 ,
is guaranteed if R r ≤ I(X r ; Z|X 1 ) and R r ≥ I(X r ; Z), and this is from the properties of AEP (similar argument is used in the proof of [17, Theorem 3] ). By using (A26) and (A27), (A37) is obtained.
Substituting (A34), (A35), (A36) and (A37) into (A33), we have
The second term in (A32) is bounded as follows.
where (1) is from the Markov chain W 1 → (Z N , X N 1 , X N r ) → W 2 , and (2) is from the Markov chain W 2 → (X N 1 , X N 2 , X N r ) → Z N , H(W 2 |X N 2 ) = 0, and the fact that X N 1 , X N 2 and X N r are independent. Consider the first term in (A39), the code-book generation of x N 2 shows that the total number of x N 2 is 2 N (I(X2;Y |Xr)− ) ( → 0 as N → ∞). Thus, using the same approach as that in [8, Lemma 3], we have
For the second term in (A39), using the same approach as that in [4, Lemma 3], we get
Now, we consider the last term of (A39). Given Z N , X N 1 , X N r and W 2 , the total number of possible codewords of x N 2 is 2 N (I(X2;Y |Xr)− −R2) ( → 0 as N → ∞). By using the Fano's inequality and (A28), we have
Substituting (A40), (A41) and (A42) into (A39), we have
Substituting (A38) and (A43) into (A32), lim N →∞ ∆ ≥ R 1 + R 2 for case 1 is proved.
Proof of lim N →∞ ∆ ≥ R 1 + R 2 for case 2:
The first term in (A44) is bounded as follows.
where (a) follows from W 1 → (X N 1 , X N r ) → Z N , H(W 1 |X N 1 ) = 0 and the fact that X N 1 is independent of X N r . Consider the first term in (A45), the code-book generation of x N 1 shows that the total number of x N 1 is 2 N (I(X1;Y |X2,Xr)− ) ( → 0 as N → ∞). Thus, using the same approach as that in [8, Lemma 3], we have
For the second term in (A45), using the same approach as that in [4, Lemma 3], we get
Now, we consider the last term of (A45). Given Z N , X N r and W 1 , the total number of possible codewords of x N 1 is 2 N (I(X1;Y |X2,Xr)− −R1) ( → 0 as N → ∞). By using the Fano's inequality and (A31), we have
Substituting (A46), (A47) and (A48) into (A45), we have
The second term in (A44) is bounded the same as that for case 1, and thus, we have
The proof is omitted here.
Substituting (A49) and (A50) into (A44), lim N →∞ ∆ ≥ R 1 + R 2 for case 2 is proved.
The proof of Theorem 2 is completed.
APPENDIX C PROOF OF THEOREM 3
Theorem 3 is proved by the following two cases.
For case 1, it is sufficient to show that the pair (R 1 , R 2 ) ∈ L 3 with the condition
is achievable. The achievability proof of (R 1 = I(X 1 ; Y,Ŷ r |X r )−I(X 1 ; Z|X 2 , X r ), R 2 = I(X 2 ; Y,Ŷ r |X 1 , X r )− I(X 2 , X r ; Z) + R * ) follows by symmetry. Here note that R * satisfies min{I(X r ; Z|X 1 ), I(X r ; Z|X 2 ),
• (Case 2) If the channel from the relay to the legitimate receiver is more noisy than the channel from the relay to the wiretapper (I(Y r ;Ŷ r |X r ) ≤ I(X r ; Y ) ≤ I(X r ; Z)), we allow both the receivers to decode x N r . For case 2, it is sufficient to show that the pair (R 1 , R 2 ) ∈ L 4 with the condition
is achievable. The achievability proof of (R 1 = I(X 1 ; Y,Ŷ r |X r )−I(X 1 ; Z|X 2 , X r ), R 2 = I(X 2 ; Y,Ŷ r |X 1 , X r )− I(X 2 ; Z|X r )) follows by symmetry.
Fix the joint probability mass function PŶ r |Yr,Xr (ŷ r |y r , x r )P Y,Z,Yr|Xr,X1,X2 (y, z, y r |x r , x 1 , x 2 )P Xr (x r )P X1 (x 1 )P X2 (x 2 ). Define the messages W 1 , W 2 taken values in the alphabets W 1 , W 2 , respectively, where
Code-book Construction for the Two Cases: 
Here note that
For each
-Second, generate 2 N (I(X2;Y,Ŷr|Xr)− ) i.i.d. codewords x N 2 according to P X2 (x 2 ), and divide them into 2 N R2 bins. Each bin contains 2 N (I(X2;Y,Ŷr|Xr)− −R2) codewords, where
-Third, generate 2 N (I(X1;Y,Ŷr|X2,Xr)− +R * −R * r1 ) i.i.d. codewords x N 1 according to P X1 (x 1 ), and divide them into 2 N R1 bins. Each bin contains 2 N (I(X1;Y,Ŷr|X2,Xr)− +R * −R * r1 −R1) codewords. Here note that from (A52) and (A54), we know that R * ≤ R * r1 , and thus, we have
In addition, by using R 1 = I(X 1 ; Y,Ŷ r |X 2 , X r ) − I(X 1 , X r ; Z) + R * , the codewords x N 1 in each bin is upper bounded by
where (a) is from (A55).
• Code-book Construction for case 2:
For each 
-Third, generate 2 N (I(X1;Y,Ŷr|X2,Xr)− ) i.i.d. codewords x N 1 according to P X1 (x 1 ), and divide them into 2 N R1 bins. Each bin contains 2 N (I(X1;Y,Ŷr|X2,Xr)− −R1) codewords, where
Encoding:
Encoding involves the mapping of message indices to channel inputs, which are facilitated by the sequences generated above. We exploit the block Markov coding scheme, as argued in [22] , the loss induced by this scheme is negligible as the number of blocks n → ∞. For block i (1 ≤ i ≤ n), encoding proceeds as follows.
First, for convenience, the messages w 1 and w 2 transmitted in the i-th block are denoted by w 1,i and w 2,i , respectively. y N r (i) andŷ N r (i) are the y N r andŷ N r for the i-th block, respectively.
• Encoding for case 1:
At the end of block i (2 ≤ i ≤ n), assume that (x N r (a i ), y N r (i),ŷ N r (m i , a i )) are jointly typical, then we choose a i+1 uniformly from bin m i , and the relay sends x N r (a i+1 ) at block i + 1. In the first block, the relay sends x N r (1) . For a given confidential message w 2 , randomly choose a codeword x N 2 in bin w 2 to transmit. Similarly, for a given confidential message w 1 , randomly choose a codeword x N 1 in bin w 1 to transmit.
• Encoding for case 2:
In block i (1 ≤ i ≤ n), the relay randomly choose an index a i from [1, 2 N (R * r2 − ) ], and sends x N r (a i ) and y N r (a i ). For a given confidential message w 2 , randomly choose a codeword x N 2 in bin w 2 to transmit. Similarly, for a given confidential message w 1 , randomly choose a codeword x N 1 in bin w 1 to transmit.
Decoding:
• Decoding for case 1:
(At the relay) At the end of block i, the relay already has a i , it then decides m i by choosing m i such that
and N is sufficiently large. Choose a i+1 uniformly from bin m i .
(At the legitimate receiver) The legitimate receiver does backward decoding. The decoding process starts at the last block n, the legitimate receiver decodes a n by choosing uniqueǎ n such that (x N r (ǎ n ), y N (n)) are jointly typical. Since R * r1 satisfies (A54), the probability P r{ǎ n = a n } goes to 1 for sufficiently large N . Next, the legitimate receiver moves to the block n−1. Now it already hasǎ n , hence we also havem n−1 = f (ǎ n ) (here f is a deterministic function, which means thatm n−1 can be determined byǎ n ). It first declares thať a n−1 is received, ifǎ n−1 is the unique one such that (x N r (ǎ n−1 ), y N (n − 1)) are joint typical. If (A54) is satisfied,ǎ n−1 = a n−1 with high probability. After knowingǎ n−1 , the destination gets an estimation of w 2,n−1 by picking the uniquew 2,n−1 such that (x N 2 (w 2,n−1 ),ŷ N r (m n−1 ,ǎ n−1 ), y N (n − 1), x N r (ǎ n−1 )) are jointly typical. We will havew 2,n−1 = w 2,n−1 with high probability, if the codewords of x N 2 is upper bounded by 2 N I(X2;Y,Ŷr|Xr) and N is sufficiently large.
After decodingw 2,n−1 , the legitimate receiver tries to find a quintuple such that (x N 1 (w 1,n−1 ), x N 2 (w 2,n−1 ),ŷ N r (m n−1 ,ǎ n−1 ), y N (n−1), x N r (ǎ n−1 )) are jointly typical. Based on the AEP, the probability P r{w 1,n−1 = w 1,n−1 } goes to 1 if the codewords of x N 1 is upper bounded by 2 N I(X1;Y,Ŷr|X2,Xr) and N is sufficiently large.
The decoding scheme of the legitimate receiver in block i (1 ≤ i ≤ n − 2) is similar to that in block n − 1, and we omit it here.
• Decoding for case 2:
(At the relay) The relay does not need to decode any codeword.
(At the legitimate receiver) In block i (1 ≤ i ≤ n), the legitimate receiver decodes a i by choosing uniqueǎ i such that (x N r (ǎ i ), y N (i)) are jointly typical. Since R * r2 satisfies (A59), the probability P r{ǎ i = a i } goes to 1 for sufficiently large N . Now since the legitimate receiver hasǎ i , he also knowsŷ N r (ǎ i ). Then he gets an estimation of w 2,i by picking the uniquew 2,i such that (x N 2 (w 2,i ),ŷ N r (ǎ i ), y N (i), x N r (ǎ i )) are jointly typical. We will havew 2,i = w 2,i with high probability, if the codewords of x N 2 is upper bounded by 2 N I(X2;Y,Ŷr|Xr) and N is sufficiently large. After decodingw 2,i , the legitimate receiver tries to find a quintuple such that
are jointly typical. Based on the AEP, the probability P r{w 1,i = w 1,i } goes to 1 if the codewords of x N 1 is upper bounded by 2 N I(X1;Y,Ŷr|X2,Xr) and N is sufficiently large.
P e ≤ is easy to be checked by using the above encoding-decoding schemes. Now, it remains to prove lim N →∞ ∆ ≥ R 1 + R 2 for both cases, see the followings.
Equivocation Analysis:
The first term in (A63) is bounded as follows.
where (a) follows from W 1 → (X N 1 , X N r ) → Z N , H(W 1 |X N 1 ) = 0 and the fact that X N 1 is independent of X N r . Consider the first term in (A64), the code-book generation of x N 1 shows that the total number of x N 1 is upper bounded by (A58). Thus, using the same approach as that in [8, Lemma 3], we have
For the second term in (A64), the code-book generation of x N r and [8, Lemma 3] guarantee that
For the third term in (A64), using the same approach as that in [4, Lemma 3], we get
Now, we consider the last term of (A64). Given w 1 , the wiretapper can do joint decoding. Specifically, given z N and w 1 ,
is guaranteed if R r ≤ I(X r ; Z|X 1 ) and
, and this is from the properties of AEP (similar argument is used in the proof of [17, Theorem 3] ). By using (A54) and (A58), (A68) is obtained.
Substituting (A65), (A66), (A67) and (A68) into (A64), we have
The second term in (A63) is bounded as follows.
where (1) is from the Markov chain W 1 → (Z N , X N 1 , X N r ) → W 2 , and (2) is from the Markov chain W 2 → (X N 1 , X N 2 , X N r ) → Z N , H(W 2 |X N 2 ) = 0, and the fact that X N 1 , X N 2 and X N r are independent. Consider the first term in (A70), the code-book generation of x N 2 shows that the total number of x N 2 is 2 N (I(X2;Y,Ŷr|Xr)− ) ( → 0 as N → ∞). Thus, using the same approach as that in [8, Lemma 3], we have
For the second term in (A70), using the same approach as that in [4, Lemma 3], we get
Now, we consider the last term of (A70). Given Z N , X N 1 , X N r and W 2 , the total number of possible codewords of x N 2 is 2 N (I(X2;Y,Ŷr|Xr)− −R2) ( → 0 as N → ∞). By using the Fano's inequality and (A56), we have
Substituting (A71), (A72) and (A73) into (A70), we have
Substituting (A69) and (A74) into (A63), lim N →∞ ∆ ≥ R 1 + R 2 for case 1 is proved.
The first term in (A75) is bounded as follows.
where (a) follows from W 1 → (X N 1 , X N r ) → Z N , H(W 1 |X N 1 ) = 0 and the fact that X N 1 is independent of X N r . Consider the first term in (A76), the code-book generation of x N 1 shows that the total number of x N 1 is 2 N (I(X1;Y,Ŷr|X2,Xr)− ) ( → 0 as N → ∞). Thus, using the same approach as that in [8, Lemma 3], we have
For the second term in (A76), using the same approach as that in [4, Lemma 3], we get
Now, we consider the last term of (A76). Given Z N , X N r and W 1 , the total number of possible codewords of x N 1 is 2 N (I(X1;Y,Ŷr|X2,Xr)− −R1) ( → 0 as N → ∞). By using the Fano's inequality and (A61), we have 
The second term in (A75) is bounded the same as that for case 1, and thus, we have lim N →∞ 1 N H(W 2 |W 1 , Z N ) ≥ I(X 2 ; Y,Ŷ r |X r ) − I(X 2 ; Z|X 1 , X r ) = R 2 .
Substituting (A80) and (A81) into (A75), lim N →∞ ∆ ≥ R 1 + R 2 for case 2 is proved.
The proof of Theorem 3 is completed.
APPENDIX D PROOF OF THEOREM 4
In this section, we prove Theorem 4: all the achievable secrecy pairs (R 1 , R 2 ) of the degraded discrete memoryless MARC-WT are contained in the set R ddo . We will prove the inequalities of Theorem 4 in the remainder of this section.
(Proof of R 1 ≤ I(X 1 , X r ; Y |X 2 , U ) − I(X 1 ; Z|U )):
1 N H(W 1 ) (H(Y i |Y i−1 , X N 2 ) − H(Y i |X 1,i , X 2,i , X r,i ) − H(Z i |Z i−1 ) + H(Z i |Z i−1 , X N 1 )) + δ(P e ) N = I(X 1 , X r ; Y |X 2 , U ) − I(X 1 ; Z|U ) + δ(P e ) N ,
where (1) is from the definition of the perfect secrecy, (2) is from the Fanos inequality, (3) is from H(W 2 |X N 2 ) = 0, (4) is from H(W 1 |X N 1 ) = 0, (5) is from the Markov chain X N 1 → (X N 2 , Y N ) → Z N and the fact that X N 1 is independent of X N 2 , (6) is from the Markov chains Y i → (Y i−1 , X N 2 ) → Z i−1 and Y i → (X 1,i , X 2,i , X r,i ) → Z i−1 , (7) is from J is a random variable (uniformly distributed over {1, 2, ..., N }), and it is independent of X N 1 , X N 2 , X N r , Y N and Z N , (8) is from J is uniformly distributed over {1, 2, ..., N }, and (9) is from the definitions that X 1 X 1,J , X 2 X 2,J , X r X r,J , Y Y J , Z Z J and U (Z J−1 , J).
By using P e ≤ , → 0 as N → ∞, lim N →∞ H(W1) N = R 1 and (A82), it is easy to see that R 1 ≤ I(X 1 , X r ; Y |X 2 , U ) − I(X 1 ; Z|U ).
(Proof of R 2 ≤ I(X 2 , X r ; Y |X 1 , U ) − I(X 2 ; Z|U )):
The proof is analogous to the proof of R 1 ≤ I(X 1 , X r ; Y |X 2 , U ) − I(X 1 ; Z|U ), and it is omitted here.
Proof of R 1 + R 2 ≤ I(X 1 , X 2 , X r ; Y |U ) − I(X 1 , X 2 ; Z|U ):
= lim (H(Y i |Y i−1 ) − H(Y i |X 1,i , X 2,i , X r,i , Z i−1 ) − H(Z i |Z i−1 ) + H(Z i |X 1,i , X 2,i , Z i−1 )) + δ(P e ) N ) (4) ≤ lim N →∞
(H(Y i |Z i−1 ) − H(Y i |X 1,i , X 2,i , X r,i , Z i−1 ) − H(Z i |Z i−1 ) + H(Z i |X 1,i , X 2,i , Z i−1 )) + δ(P e ) N ) (5) = lim N →∞
= lim 
= I(X 1 , X 2 , X r ; Y |U ) − I(X 1 , X 2 ; Z|U ),
where (1) is from the Fanos inequality, (2) is from (W 1 , W 2 ) → (X N 1 , X N 2 , Z N ) → Y N , (3) is from Y i → (X 1,i , X 2,i , X r,i ) → Z i−1 , (4) is from Y i → Y i−1 → Z i−1 , (5) is from J is a random variable (uniformly distributed over {1, 2, ..., N }), and it is independent of X N 1 , X N 2 , X N r , Y N and Z N , (6) is from J is uniformly distributed over {1, 2, ..., N }, and (7) is from the definitions that X 1 X 1,J , X 2 X 2,J , X r X r,J , Y Y J , Z Z J and U (Z J−1 , J), and the fact that P e → 0 as N → ∞.
By using lim N →∞ ∆ ≥ R 1 + R 2 and (A83), it is easy to see that R 1 + R 2 ≤ I(X 1 , X 2 , X r ; Y |U ) − I(X 1 , X 2 ; Z|U ).
The proof of Theorem 4 is completed.
